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ABSTRACT 
(fhis paper deals with the problems developing countries face under the current TRIPS 
Agreement in accessing cheap and affordable drugs in order to fight infectious diseases, 
especially HIV/AIDS. The paper also focuses on how the Doha Ministerial Conference has 
impacted on this issue. 
Firstly, the reader will be made familiar with some background information on patent 
protection in general, including arguments in favour and in opposition of patent protection, 
with a focus on the pharmaceutical industry. 
This is followed by information on the economic performance of the pharmaceutical 
industry and drug prices, arguing that prices currently charged are in general not due to 
high costs for research and development, but to a large extent caused by extremely high 
profits. 
After providing an overview of the history of international patent protection, and an 
overview of the relevant regulation in the TRIPS Agreement, the paper examines the 
outcome of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the impact of this declaration on 
compulsory licensing and parallel importing. 
The paper supports the suggestion of a group of developing countries to enable Members 
to give effect to compulsory licenses issued by foreign governments and recommends that 
this suggestion be adopted in order to improve the access to cheap medicine for the 
economically weakest developing countries. 
Besides that, the Declaration does no more than confirming what has been clear before the 
Ministerial Conference with regard to compulsory licensing. 
The paper supports the Ministerial Declaration in so far as it confirms the right of WTO 
Member States to decide for themselves the question of the legality of parallel importing 
and finds that developing countries should make use of parallel importing by applying the 
exhaustion of rights principle in their national legislation. 
It concludes that although the Declaration points towards the right direction , the 
opportunities for developing countries in accessing cheap medicine depend to a large 
extent on the approach that will be taken by the Council on TRIPS with regard to 
compulsory licensing. It is also important that Members not put diplomatic pressure on 
countries that decide to make use of their legitimate rights under the TRIPS Agreement. 
This research paper contains approximately 13.299 words including footnotes. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The discussions on the TRIPS Agreement and its relationship to public health 
issues was one of the topics that attracted a lot of interest from observers o,f the Doha 
Ministerial Conference in November 2001. The discussions on TRIPS and public 
health issues were put on the agenda of the conference because developing and least-
developed countries had concerns about limitations to the access to affordable 
medicine imposed on them by the TRIPS Agreement. 
The importance of these discussions can also be seen in the fact that the ministers 
agreed on a special Ministerial Declaration, dealing with this topic.
1 
It is obvious that immediate action is necessary m order to address the 
problems currently facing developing countries due to the spread of infections such 
as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. And the problems are predicted to get worse 
in the future. 95% of the estimated 36 million people living with AIDS world-wide 
are living in developing countries.2 The majority of these people live in sub-Saharan 
Af1ica, South or South East Asia and Latin America. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the hardest hit region in the world, accounting for 3.8 
of the 5.3 million new infections and for about 2.4 out of 3.0 million deaths annually. 
South African life expectancy is expected to decline by as much as fourteen years 
between 2005 and 2010,3 due to a very high mortality rate as a result of HIV/AIDS 
with as much as 6000 people dying every day.
4 
Some of the hardest hit countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and later possibly in 
South and South-East Asia, face a demographic upheaval. HIV/AIDS and associated 
diseases that will reduce human life expectancy by up to 30 years and kill as many as 
a quarter of their populations over a decade or less.
5 
1 WTO "Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health" (20 November 2001) 
WT/MIN(Ol)/DEC/2 (in the following referred to as "Ministerial Declaration") . 
2 Rosalyn S Park "The International Drug Industry: What the Future Holds for South Africa's 
HIV/AIDS Patients" (2002) 11 Minn J Global Trade 125, 127 . 
3 Rosalyn S Park, above, 127. 
4 Rosalyn S Park, above, 127. 
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Furthermore, the spread of HIV/AIDS in developing and least developed 
countries does more than kill infected individuals. The grief suffered by survivors, 
and the possible lasting psychological damage, especially to young children who Jose 
a parent, are potentially the most damaging consequences of the epidemic. 
It is obvious that the effects of the infection go beyond the personal sufferer. 
The high number of HIV/AIDS infected people living in these countries will lead to 
consequences like economic downturn, due to the fact that more public funding 
needs to be spent on healthcare and that the workforce of the countries effected will 
be weakened. 
One of the main problems with regard to the fight against HIV/AIDS in 
developing countries is that of prohibitive prices for medicine. The cost for a triple 
AZT cocktail can easily run up to as much as US$ 750 per month, which places the 
medicine clearly out of reach for the majority of, for example, South African 
HIV/ AIDS victims, due to the fact that the annual per capita income is only 
US$6000.6 
This paper will deal with the possibilities for developing and least developed 
countries in accessing cheap medicine, with a focus on the production of generics 
under compulsory licensing schemes and parallel importing strategies. The impact of 
the Ministerial Declaration on the options developing countries have, will be 
examined and discussed. 
5 National Intelligence Council "National Intelligence Estimate: The Global Infectious Disease Threat 
and its Implications for the United States" (2000) Issue 6 Summer 2000 Environmental Change and 
Security Project Report 5. 
6 Theodore Bailey "Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in the Development 
and Distribution of HIV/AIDS Drugs" (2001) U Ill J L Tech & Pol'y 193, 195. 
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II WHY PROTECT PATENTS AT ALL? 
A Different Approaches With Regard to Patent Protection 
Granting a patent to a private or publicly owned company means effectively 
granting a monopoly over the production, use, and distribution of a certain 
innovation. 
The negative effects which monopolies have for the consumer, namely no 
competition on the market for the product which the patent is granted for and 
consequently higher prices for the product than the would be price in case of 
working competition, are well understood consequences of monopolies. Indeed, this 
is the very reason why patents are sought after. 
Whether or not the protection of intellectual property makes sense from an 
economic point of view is subject of considerable controversy. 
There are essentially two different positions.7 
On the one hand the creation of intellectual property would be undermined if 
protection in the form of control over the production, use, and distribution would not 
exist. Fewer innovations would be made, due to a lack of motivation to develop new 
innovations. The idea behind this approach is to give patent holders the chance to 
recover the money they invested on research and development of new drugs and to 
improve social welfare. If looking at the immense costs that need to be spent on 
research and development before a drug gets approved for public sale, this argument 
seems to make good sense. In 1990, the United States government estimated that a 
single new drug took ten to twelve years to come to market at a cost of US$359 
million. 8 
On the other side are those who support the idea that intellectual property 
should be freely accessible. They argue that any kind of access to information 
stimulates new developments and makes new innovation more likely. Western 
7 Shubha Ghosh, "Pills, Patents and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit on Patent 
Rights" (2001) 53 Fla L Rev 789, 796. 
8 John A Harrelson "TRIPS , Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the proper 
balance between intellectual property rights and compassion" 7 SPG Widener L. Symp. J. 175, 184. 
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"owners" of intellectual property do not have a natural, human right to the 
knowledge they create, but rather have co-opted the language of natural rights as a 
proxy to justify their desire for greater economic gain from increased intellectual 
property protection.9 People arguing in favour of this approach would support weak 
intellectual property protection, if any at all. A potential way to justify this approach 
is to argue that communitarian values and interests in free access to information 
would outweigh the inventor's interest in the protection of his/her ideas, 10 as well as 
that human rights aspects need to be considered when discussing the access to 
information. 
Opponents of strong patent protection argue further, that research companies, 
especially in the field of pharmaceuticals, often receive public funding. 11 Therefore, 
the argument runs, it is not justifiable to grant patents in those cases, since this gives 
companies the chance to "capture" public research expenditure. 
Keith A Maskus has undertaken an analysis on the effects intellectual 
property protection has on countries and whether or not there are benefits in high 
intellectual property standards. He concludes that the complexity of intellectual 
property protection supports both optimistic as well as pessimistic claims about how 
countries will be affected. 12 According to Maskus , none of the arguments in favour or 
against strong intellectual property regimes may be decisively rejected by theoretical 
or empirical analysis. He indicates, however, that the work reviewed by him suggests 
that the short-run impacts of the patent protection standards in the TRlPS Agreement 
will be essentially redist1ibuti ve between countries, with the bulk of gains accruing to 
the United States and other technology developers. Over the longer term, however, 
he suggests that there are mechanisms that could enhance technical change and 
growth in the technology importing countries. 13 
9 Robert J Gutowski, "The Marriage of Intellectual Property and International Trade in the TRIPS 
Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?" (1999) 47 Buff L Rev 713, 715. 10 Shubha Ghosh, "Pills, Patents and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit on Patent 
Rights" (2001) 53 Fla L Rev 789, 796. 
11 Mary K Schug "Promoting Access to HIV/AlDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa Within the 
Framework of International Intellectual Property Law" (2001) 19 Law & Ineq 229, 241. 12 Keith A Maskus "Lessons From Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property 
Rights" (2000) 53 Vand L R 2219, 2239. 
13 Keith A Maskus, above, 2239. 
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Theodore Bailey has undertaken another analysis, focusing on the effects of 
compulsory licensing. He comes to the conclusion that although compulsory 
licensing might weaken the incentives that firms have in investing in research, this 
does not necessarily mean that such a reduction will reduce the level of research, or 
even that such a reduction would be socially undesirable. 14 He argues that increasing 
the level of investment for research and development does not, after a certain point, 
produce benefits commensurate with the costs of such investment, and that the 
pharmaceutical industry might well have passed this crucial point, so that a decrease 
in investment would not necessarily lead to a social net loss. 15 
All in all, one can say that the protection of patents is certainly an important 
means in order to encourage firms to invest money into research and development, 
but the grant of monopolies via patents might have a negative influence on the 
general availability of medicine. 
B The Pharmaceutical Industry 
Pharmaceutical companies strongly argue that they need effective patent 
protection in order to create an incentive for them to undertake the costly research 
and development necessary to create a drug and bring it to market. 
Although there can be no doubt about the fact that the development of new medicine 
is indeed a costly undertaking, it is interesting to take a look at some data regarding 
the performance of the pharmaceutical industry. This reveals not only that the 
industry spends considerable amounts of money on research, but also that the 
industry's profits are sky high compared to other industries. 
1 Differences in drug prices 
The price difference between the original product on the one hand and the 
generic equivalent has in some cases been reportedly so high, that it is hard to 
believe that the higher prices for the original product result from the costs spent on 
research and development as often argued by company officials. According to a 
14 Theodore Bailey "Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in the Development 
and Distribution of HIV/AIDS Drugs" (2001) 2001 U Ill J L Tech & Pol'y 193,215. 
15 Theodore Bailey, above, 215. 
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paper by Harvey E Bale Jr, the Senior Vice President International Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America, 15-20 percent of the price of an originator's 
product are constituted by the research and development costs. 16 Assuming that this 
is true, it is hard for pharmaceutical companies to avoid the suspicion that they use 
the monopolies they are granted to charge prices far above prices that would be 
expected in a competitive market. 
A comparison of prices for HIV/ AIDS medicines illustrates the fact that the 
original drugs are usually significantly higher than the prices charged for generic 
drugs. 3TC, also known as Lamivudine, a drug produced by Glaxo Welcome and 
patented in a number of countries until between 2009 and 2011 17, is used by 
HIV/ AIDS patients for antiviral therapy. The drug has reportedly been found to be 
priced at US$3,271 in the United States whereas Indian producers offer the generic 
equivalent for US$190 (Cipla Ltd) and US$98 (Hetero Drugs Limited) respectively. 18 
This is not the only case in which producers of generic drugs offer their products at 
substantially lower prices than the originators. The price of a combination of three 
anti-HIV/AIDS drugs (3TC, Zerit, and Viramune) for the treatment of one patient 
amounts up to between US$10,000 and 15,000, while the same therapy can be 
undertaken with generic medicines supplied by Cipla Ltd at a price US$350 - 600. 
When looking at these numbers, it is hard to believe that the high differences 
in prices are due only to higher costs of production and to research and development 
costs. If looking at the example of 3TC and the price for the drug in the US, 20% of 
the drug's price (the part of the price attributed to research and development costs as 
stated by Harvey E Bale Jr) would be US$654. After deducting this amount from the 
original price the medicine would still cost US$2617. 
16 Harvey E Bale "Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals: A Platform for Investment, Markets and 
Improved Health in the Americas" (March 1996, Paper presented to Workshop ID, Cartagena) 
<www.sice.oas.org/ip/Phrma_e.asp> (last accessed 21 February 2002). 
17 P Boulet, J Perriens, F Renaud -Therv "Patent Situation of HIV/ AIDS Related Drugs in 80 
Countries" (UNAIDS/WHO, Geneva, January 2000) 14 
www.unaids.org/publications/documents/health/access/patsit.doc (last accessed 21 February 2002). 
18 Cecilia Oh "Patents and Monopoly Prices" (Third World Network) 
<www.twnside.org.sg7title/twrl3lb.htm> (last accessed 21 February 2002). 
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2 The economic performance of the pharmaceutical industry 
According to Fortune's list of the 500 largest American companies for the 
year 2000 19, the average return on revenues was 18.6% whereas the median for 
returns on assets was 17 .7%. Both percentages outweigh by far the overall median 
for the other Fortune 500 industries. The median for the other industries in the 
Fortune 500 list is 4.9% return on revenues and 3.9% return on assets. The last 
category that was evaluated by Fortune was the return on equity. Although the 
pharmaceutical industry does not occupy the top rank, the 11 pharmaceutical 
companies in the list, still managed to reach a median return on equity of 29.4%, 
nearly twice as much as the overall median of 15.4%. 
The most successful pharmaceutical company among the 500 largest 
American companies was Merck. Merck made some US$40.4 billion in sales with 
profits running up to US$6.8 billion. The profit Merck made in the year 2000 was 
higher than the profit of all the Fortune 500 companies in the airline, entertainment, 
food production, metals and hotel/casino/resorts industries combined.20 Although 
these numbers are already outstanding, Merck's drug operation was even more 
profitable than it seems at first glance, due to the fact that approximately half of the 
company's revenues come from its massive pharmaceutical benefit management 
company, Merck-Medco, which has much lower profit margins than the parent 
company's drug business. If only looking at the drug-producing part of Merck, the 
profits were 44.2% of the revenues in 2000.21 
Although it can often be heard that pharmaceutical companies need to make 
higher profits than other industries in order to assure sufficient funds to finance the 
expensive research and development of new drugs, the Fortune 500 drug companies 
have spent more money on marketing and administration than on research. While an 
average of 12% has been spent on research and development, 30% were spent on 
marketing and administration . 
19 Noshua Watson "Inside the 500" (8 April 2001 ) Fortune 126. 
20 Public Citizen's Congress Watch "Drug Industry Most Profitable Again" (11 April 2001 ) Press 
Release >www.citizen.org/congress/reform/drug_industry/profits/articles.cfm?ID=838> (last accessed 
21 February 2002) 
21 Public Citizen 's Congress Watch, above. 
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Looking at these numbers it is hard to believe that high drug prices are mainly 
due to research and development costs, and feeds the suspicion that drugs could be 
priced considerably lower if the pharmaceutical industry would accept smaller 
profits, without substantially endangering the pharmaceutical companies. 
III THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT PROTECTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SCALE PRIOR TO TRIPS 
A The Paris and the Berne Convention 
The law of intellectual property is not a creature of the information age, 
despite its popular association with modern, high-tech industries.22 The Paris 
Convention of 1883 and the Berne Convention of 1885 emerged at a time when 
international agreements were being formed regarding diverse concerns ranging from 
posts and telegraphs to weights and measures to trade and customs.23 Prior to this 
international union, only limited bilateral treaties existed to protect foreign 
intellectual property.24 
The Paris Convention was the first international instrument that 
comprehensively dealt with the protection of patents and trademarks.25 That the 
protection of intellectual property rights raised concerns in a lot of countries can be 
seen by the wide range of countries which signed the treaty in 1883. The treaty was 
01iginally signed by Belgium, Brazil , France, Ecuador, Guatemala, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal , Salvador, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia and the United 
Kingdom, whereas the United States joined the Agreement three years after it came 
into effect. 26 
Although the Paris Convention does not have as many signatories as the TRIPS 
Agreement, its 98 signatories were responsible for more than 88% of the world trade 
in goods in 1985. 
22 Robert J Gutowski "The Marriage of Intellectual Property and International Trade in the TRIPS 
Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?" (1999) 47 Buff L Rev 713, 717. 23 Robert J Gutowski, above, 717 . 
24 Robert J Gutowski, above, 717 . 
25 Michael J Trebilcock, Robert Howse The Regulation of International Trade (2 ed, Routledge, 
London, New York, 1999) 31 2. 
26 Robert J Gutowski, above, 718. 
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The Paris Convention applies to "industrial property", a term covering 
patents, trademarks, industrial designs and trade names,27 and also provides 
protection against unfair competition.28 
The National Treatment Principle is the core principle of the Paris Convention.29 
According to this principle Members are not allowed to discriminate between foreign 
and domestic intellectual property. The Convention also obliges its signatories to 
introduce minimum standards with regard to patent and trademark protection, but 
does not provide a dispute settlement mechanism for disputes among its Members 
and does not set standards for the protection of enforcement of the rights conferred to 
patent holders. 
A number of factors now make the Paris Convention look outdated. The lack of a 
dispute settlement regulation, the lack of rules regarding enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and in addition the evolution of the world trading system, 
technological changes, m particular generalised computerisation and digital 
technology, were all factors that precipitated the development of new regulation 
regarding intellectual property rights. 30 
The Berne Convention of 1885 does not protect patents and trademarks, but 
rather sets minimum standards with regard to the protection of author's rights. 
Therefore, the Berne Convention is not of any fmther importance for this discussion. 
27 Article l (2) of the Paris Convention states: 
"The protection of industrial property has as its object patents, utility models, industrial designs, 
trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the 
repression of unfair competition." 
28 Robert J Gutowski "The Marriage of Intellectual Property and International Trade in the TRIPS 
Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?" (1999) 47 BuffL Rev 713, 718 . 29 Article 2 ( 1) of the Paris Convention states: 
"Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in 
all the other countries of the Union the advantages that th eir respective laws now grant, or may 
hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by this 
Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal 
remedy against any infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and f ormalities imposed 
upon nationals are complied with. " 
30 Daniel Gervois The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analyses (Sweet & Maxwell, London 
1998) 10. 
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B World Intellectual Property Organisation 
Located in Geneva, Switzerland, the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) is an international organisation dedicated to the protection of intellectual 
property rights operating under the United Nations (UN). Established as an 
organisation being responsible for administering four international treaties in 1889 
under the name BIR.PI, WIPO nowadays administers 23 different international 
treaties. 
VI THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
After providing the reader with an overview of the history of negotiations that 
finally led to the current TRIPS Agreement, the reader will be introduced to the 
principles and articles that are of special interest with regard to the protection of 
patents and therefore pharmaceuticals. 
A The Way to TRIPS 
When the Uruguay Round of negotiations staited in 1986, the subject of 
intellectual property rights was completely unfamiliar to international trade 
economists.31 It must be assumed that this was the case due to the fact that global 
trade policy concerns had not moved into questions of domestic business regulation. 
As at the end of the 1980 's some 40 countries across the world did not grant patents 
for pharmaceutical product innovations.32 
Those who felt that there was a need for new standards for intellectual 
property protection used the Ministerial Conference at Punta del Este (Uruguay) in 
September 1986 to inscribe the matter of intellectual property protection on the 
3 1 Keith E Maskus "Lessons from Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property 
Rights" (2000) 53 Vand L R 2219, 2220. 
32 According to Wolfgang E Siebeck, Robert E Evanson, William Lesser, Carlos A Primo Braga 
"Strengthening the Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries: A Survey of the 
Literature" (World Bank Discussion Paper No 112, World Bank, Washington DC 1990) 95, the 
following countries did not provide patents for pharmaceutical product innovations: Chad, China, 
Ghana, India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Bolivia, Ecuador, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Peru, Poland, Syria, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Argentina, Greece, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Portugal , Romania, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Spain, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, 
German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, and the USSR. 
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agenda of the Uruguay Round.33 Although the protection of intellectual property 
rights did not have a very long, if any, tradition, in most developing countries, at the 
end of the Uruguay Round, the TRIPS Agreement was signed by 117 nations on 15 
April 1994.34 Since then the number of signatories has increased to 144 as of 1 
January 2002.35 
Seeing markets lost to successful imitators, US industry, with the aid of the 
US government, in the early 1980's began to make energetic efforts to strengthen 
patent regimes in the developing world.36 With the support of other industries, 
American representatives from pharmaceutical firms and trade associations argued 
that intellectual property should be included in the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
negotiations.37 In alliance with their counterparts in Europe and Japan, they were 
finally successful in getting the intellectual property issues on the agenda.38 
The US finally managed to achieve an agreement that satisfied most of the 
interests of the US industry, including the requirement that signatory countries grant 
patent protection for pharmaceutical innovations. 39 However, some compromises to 
developing country concerns were included in the final draft. These included the 
exclusion of patents on life forms, the ten-year transition period for developing 
countries, and the allowance of compulsory licensing, albeit with stringent 
restrictions. 40 
Developing countries usually do not have access to large numbers of well 
educated researchers and scientists, and cannot compete in the production of research 
intensive products, but often have a comparative advantage in actually making 
products rather than developing them. A high standard of patent protection which 
limits the possibilities to legitimately imitate certain products can actually be to the 
33 Daniel Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting Histo,y and Analyses (Sweet & Maxwell, London 
1998) 10. 
34 John A Harrelson "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the proper 
balance between intellectual property rights and compassion" 7 SPG Widener L Symp J 175, 176. 
35 see: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm. 
36 Jean A Lanjouw, Iain Cockburn "Do Patents Matter?: Empirical Evidence After GATT" in Working 
Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 7495, Cambridge/MA, 2000) 5. 37 Jean O Lanjouw, Iain Cockburn, above, 5. 
38 Jean O Lanjouw, Iain Cockburn, above, 5. 
39 Jean O Lanjouw, Iain Cockburn, above, 6. 
40 Judy Rein "International Governance Through Trade Agreements: Patent Protection for Essential 
Medicines" (2001) 21 Nw J Int'l L & Bus 379,393. 
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detriment of developing countries. This is due to the fact that prices in monopolistic 
markets are, generally speaking, of a higher average than in markets with working 
competition and secondly because of the decline in revenues and employment in 
industries specialised in imitating products. 
The mam basis for the developing countries' opposition to an agreement 
within the GATT was the idea that WIPO was a more appropriate forum for 
questions dealing with patent protection. Developing countries were also concerned 
that the objectives of those in favour of a strong patent protection system under the 
roof of the WTO were contrary to the economic interests of developing countries.41 
Finally, the developing countries overcame their doubts and decided to join 
the TRIPS Agreement. One reason which was given by the developing countJies for 
doing so was not the conviction that an agreement on intellectual property rights 
would contribute to the liberalisation of world trade, but rather to use their approval 
as a "bargaining chip" in return for access to the markets of developed countries.42 
Thus, rather than putting their main focus during the Uruguay Round on intellectual 
property issues, developing countries focused their attention on potential gains in 
other areas, such as agriculture or textiles.43 
B Important Principles in the TRIPS Agreement Regarding Pharmaceuticals 
1 National Treatment principle and Most Favoured Nation principle 
The two core principles which are included in the TRIPS Agreement are the 
National Treatment principle (see Article 3) and the Most Favoured Nation principle 
(see Article 4). They are not only core p1inciples of TRIPS but are the principles 
upon the WTO is founded and it can be assumed that these principles are well 
understood and do therefore not require further explanation. 
Both principles are subject to exceptions under certain conditions. 
41 Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse The Regulation of International Trade (2 ed, Routledge, 
London, New York, 1999) 320. 
42 May L Harris "TRIPS: Historical Overview and Basic Principles" (2001) 12 J Contemp Legal 
Issues, 454, 457. 
43 May L Harris, above, 457 
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2 Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement 
Two further basic principles that need to be taken into account when 
interpreting the TRIPS Agreement can be found in Articles 7 and 8 of the Agreement. 
Article 7 requires that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to balance of rights and obligations. 
Article 8 (1) is of special importance with regard to this topic, due to the fact 
that it states: 
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, 
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
Article 8 (2) states further that 
Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of the 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders through the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely 
affect the international transfer of technology. 
3 Article 27 - Patentable Subject Matter 
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, the drafting of which was inspired in 
part by Article 10 of the draft WIPO Patent Law Treaty,44 establishes a general 
principle of eligibility of patents.45 
44 Daniel Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (Sweet & Maxwell, London 
1998) 147. 
45 Daniel Gervais, above, 147. 
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The general principle of eligibility of patents does not only require patent 
protection to be granted for any kind of invented products, but explicitly requires 
patent protection for the process of the product manufacture as well as for the 
finished product. 
Member States are obliged to ensure patent protection is granted under their 
national laws where the applicant for a patent can prove that the invention is new, 
involves an inventive step, and is capable of industrial application. Due to the fact that 
the TRIPS Agreement contains only minimum standards with regard to the protection 
of patents,46 Members States are free to set out lower standards before a patent is 
granted. This is, of course, rather of academic interest, especially with regard to the 
case of developing countries and their access to affordable medicine, since these 
countries have an interest in a lower standard of protection rather than a higher 
standard of patent protection. 
Article 27 .1 reqmres further that patents must be granted on a non-
discriminatory basis, which means that patents need to be granted regardless of the 
field of technology, the place of invention and whether the product is an imported or 
locally made product. The latter is an application of the fundamental National 
Treatment doctrine. 
Subsections 2 and 3 contain exceptions with regard to the patentability of 
inventions which fulfil the conditions as set out in subsection 1 and for which Member 
States would normally have to grant patent protection. 
Article 27 .2 provides that 
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their 
territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public 
or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid 
serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made 
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law. 
46 See Article 1.1. 
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This provision therefore allows Members States to refuse to grant patent protection 
where the commercial exploitation of a patent could endanger the ordre public or 
morality within the territory of the Member State. 
This means that patentability may not be denied in cases in which the invention 
itself leads to a risk to ordre public or morality, but rather only where the commercial 
exploitation threatens to harm ordre public or morality. 
Article 27.3 allows a Member State to exclude from patentability diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals. It also allows 
the exclusion from patentability of plants and animals, other than micro-organisms, and 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-
biological and microbiological processes. 
When talking about the patentability of medicine, it should be noted that those 
countries that did not provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals but were forced to 
do so as a result of the TRIPS Agreement, do not need to protect pharmaceuticals for 
which a patent application was filed before 1 January 1995.47 
This means that other products, including those already applied for or patented in 
other countries, or commercialised before that date, will remain in the public domain, 
unless the national law allows (as in the case of Brazil) the retroactive protection of 
the so-called "pipeline" products.48 
4 Article 28 - Rights Conferred 
Article 28 deals with the rights a patentee shall at least be granted under the 
national law of the TRIPS Member States. It has been said that article 27 was inspired 
by the draft Patent Law Treaty. The same is true for article 28.1 which sets minimum 
standards for the exclusive rights Members States are obliged to confer to patentees. 
The standards included in the article can be considered common for 
industrialised nations, due to the fact that each of the terms included appeared in one or 
47 Carlos M Correa "Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries" (2001) 3 Tu! J 
Tech & Intel! Prop, 1, 3. 
48 Carlos M Correa, above, 3. 
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even more national laws before the TRIPS Agreement.49 Article 28.l(a) obliges 
national governments to ensure that third parties do not make, use, offer for sale, sell or 
import any goods under patent protection without the patentee's consent in cases where 
the patent is granted for a product. 
Article 28. l(b) obliges Member States to ensure that where a patent is granted 
for a process rather than a product, the process may not be used without the holders' 
consent. Products which are directly obtained from a patented product may not be 
made, used, offered for sale, sold or imported for the mentioned purposes. 
Article 28.2 provides that Member States shall make available the opportunity 
of assigning and licensing of a patent to a third party. 
5 Article 29 - Test on patent applications 
Article 29.1 introduces a substantial rule to the Agreement, which was lacking 
in the Paris Convention, but which is quite common in patent laws, namely the precise 
test imposed on patent applications in respect of the description of the invention .50 
Article 29.2 allows Members to require information on the grant of patents regarding 
the same inventions under foreign jurisdictions, as long as the requested data is relevant 
to the application concerned. 
6 Articles 30 and 31 
Articles 30 and 31 both deal with exceptions to the exclusive rights that 
Members need to grant to patent holders in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. The 
difference between both articles is that article 30 must be seen as a general clause, 
whereas the exceptions under article 31 are limited to the cases explicitly dealt with in 
that section. 
49 Daniel Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (Sweet & Maxwell , London 
1998) 154. 
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7 Analyses of the structure of Articles 27 to 31 
Looking at the structure of articles 27 to 31 it becomes obvious that the 
articles start with the general rule of article 27.1 under which Member States are 
obliged to ensure the protection of patents, regardless of the field of technology. 
In subsequent articles, the Agreement allows certain exceptions with regard to the 
standard of patent protection that must be granted. 
Whereas article 27.2 and 27.3 allow Member States to exclude a certain 
product completely from patentability, articles 30 and 31 do not go that far, since they 
do not allow a Member State to deny patentability to certain products per se, but only 
allow the use of patents as long as the conditions set out in the articles are met. 
In both cases, article 27 on the one hand and articles 30 and 31 on the other, a general 
clause is followed by a more detailed rule with regard to the exceptions that are 
allowed. 
It can probably be taken as being a general principal, that a general clause can only 
apply to cases which are not covered by a specific regulation. 
This means, for the relationship of articles 30 and 31, that the general clause of article 
30 cannot apply to cases which are explicitly dealt with under article 31. 
Since, as indicated above, the exceptions provided within article 27 allow the denial 
of patentability per se, they go further than those in articles 30 and 31, and these 
articles must seen to be in a hierachy. 
This means that the exception with the weakest impact on the interests of the 
patentee needs to be looked at first. If the aim which Member States wish to 
legitimately achieve cannot be achieved under that particular exception, then, but 
only then, it is legitimate to make use of the next step. 
Member States must therefore try to achieve their legitimate aims by making use of 
the exceptions under article 31 first , due to the fact that this has the weakest impact 
on the patentee's interest. 
If the Member States can prove that the exceptions provided for in a11icle 31 are not 
sufficient, then it must be legitimate to make use of the exceptions under article 27. 
50 Daniel Gervais, above, 156. 
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8 Articles 41 - 45 of the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement, unlike the Paris or Berne Convention, reqmres 
Member States to implement enforcement procedures, therefore setting out minimum 
standards with regard to lawsuits involving patent infringement.51 
The requirements that member States need to comply with are set out in Articles 41 
to 45. 
The procedural standards required by the TRIPS Agreement include a wide 
range of legal sanctions, such as the requirement to provide legislation under which 
patent holders must be given the chance to apply for injunctive relief (Article 44). 
Member States are also obliged to ensure that national authorities are given the 
power to order the payment of damages, including legal fees, payable by the 
infringer to the patent holder (Article 45). 
V PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO ACCESSING AFFORDABLE 
MEDICINE UNDER THE CURRENT TRIPS AGREEMENT 
This section will discuss different ways in which developing countries can 
access medicine at affordable prices without violating their obligations under the 
current TRIPS Agreement and take into account the effects that the Ministerial 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health might have in the future. 
A Compulsory Licensing 
I Compulsory licensing in general 
The term "compulsory licensing" refers to practices under which national 
governments license the use of a patent without the patent holders consent.52 
Provisions which allow the granting of compulsory licensing can be found in a 
5 1 Article 1.1 states: Members shall give effect to the provisions in this Agreement. Members may, but 
shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. ... " 
52 Michael D Scott ,,Compulsory Working, Abuse and Revocation" in Anthony D' Amato and Doris 
Estelle Long (ed) International Intellectual Property Law (Kluwer Law International, London, The 
Hague, Boston, 1997) 361. 
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number of national patent laws. In international intellectual property law the three 
most common situations in which a compulsory license is granted are where a 
dependant patent is being blocked, where a patent is not being worked on, or where 
an invention relates to food or medicine.53 Additionally, provisions that allow 
governments to issue compulsory licenses can often be found in patent or antitrust 
laws where they are included in order to give governments the opportunity to remedy 
behaviour that is illegal under the national antitrust law, or where the invention is 
important to national defence or where the entity acquiring a compulsory license is 
h · 54 t e sovereign. 
(a) Use of compulsory licenses 
Compulsory licenses have been granted extensively in developed countries , 
such as Japan, European countJies or by Canada and the United States . These 
licenses were not only granted for specific industries of high importance for a 
country's social benefit, for example the food or the pharmaceutical industry, but 
have occurred in a number of different industries, such as the computer, software or 
other modem technologies. Compulsory licenses have for example been granted in 
the United States for tow truck technologies in the year 2000.55 
Canada has a long history of granting compulsory licenses on 
pharmaceuticals, and compulsory licenses were granted nearly automatically. 
However, Canada was pressured by the United States to review its practice as a 
condition to join the NAFIA.56 
(b) Effects of compulsory licenses 
There can be no doubt that the granting of compulsory licenses will usually 
have negative effects on the benefits derived from the exploitation of the protected 
53 Gianna Julian-Arnod "Compulsory Licensing and Patents" in Anthony D ' Amato and Dori s Estelle 
Long (ed) lntemational !11tellect11al Property Law (Kluwer Law International, London, The Hague, 
Boston, 1997) 357. 
54 Gianna Juli an-Arnod, above, 357. 
55 James Love "Compulsory Licensing: Models For State Practi ce In Developing Countries, Access to 
Medicine and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Accord" (Paper Prepared for the United Nations 
Development Programme, 2 1 January 2001 ) Paragraph 5 
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recommendedstatepractice.html> (last accessed 21 January 2002). 
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intellectual property right. 57 Nations granting compulsory licenses argue that these 
"takings" represent the negotiated exchange for recognising foreign intellectual 
property rights. 58 
The threat of granting compulsory licenses encourages the involved parties to 
grant licenses voluntarily59 so that granting of a compulsory license might lead to 
competition on the specific market, which leads usually to lower prices for the 
branded product. 
The main aim of compulsory licenses, however, will usually not be to lower prices 
for the original product, although this might be the case where compulsory licenses 
are granted to remedy contraventions of antitrust laws. Instead, the objective is 
generally to obtain benefits which go beyond reduced prices, such as improvements 
in a country's social welfare. 
2 Compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement deals with the use of patented products 
without the authorisation of the holder. It provides regulation under which Member 
States may implement legislation in their national laws which allow their 
governments to auth01ise patented products under certain circumstances. 
(a) Members are free to determine grounds for granting compulsory 
licenses 
Although negotiators considered setting out specific grounds for the granting 
of compulsory licenses, they finally decided not do so, prefening instead to leave the 
decision whether or not to grant compulsory licenses (and in which cases to grant 
compulsory licenses) to the national govemments.60 Due to the fact that the TRIPS 
Agreement does not set out the grounds on which a compulsory license may be 
56 James Love, above, Paragraph 5. 
57 Anthony D' Amato and Doris Estelle Long "The Economics of Compulsory Requirements" in 
Anthony D' Amato and Doris Estelle Long (ed) lntemational Intellectual Property Law (Kluwer Law 
International, London, The Hague, Boston, 1997) 360. 
58 Anthony D' Amato and Doris Estelle Long, above, 360. 
59 Cole M Fauver "Theory and Practice" in Anthony D' Amato and Doris Estelle Long (ed), above, 
362. 
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granted, Member States may grant licenses on any grounds. In short, the grounds for 
granting compulsory licenses are subject to the Members' discretion. 
In so far as the Ministerial Declaration states "each Member has the right to 
grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which 
such licenses are granted",61 the Ministerial Declaration does not contain anything 
new, but rather simply confirms the existing position. 
By allowing Member States to grant compulsory licenses, Article 31 does not 
allow removal of patent protection for certain patented products, Q..Ut gives the 
opportunity to allow certain companies to legally produce copies of the patented 
original. Granting a compulsory licence does not affect a patent holder's right to take 
judicial action against companies who do not hold the necessary license but 
nevertheless produce the drug for which a compulsory licence is issued.62 
(b) Safeguards to be respected before compulsory licenses are granted 
Rather than setting out specific cases in which compulsory licenses may be 
granted, article 31 provides a number of conditions which need to be complied with 
before a compulsory licenses is granted.63 These conditions can be described as 
safeguards for the protection of the patent holders interests. 
Generally speaking, it can be said that the granting of compulsory licenses 
underlies strict safeguards, considerably restricting the opportunity to grant a 
compulsory license. 
Member States shall only grant such licenses where the proposed user has previously 
tried to obtain a license from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions. A compulsory license may be granted only if such efforts have been 
without any success within a reasonable period of time.64 This condition is subject to 
60 Daniel Gervais The TR!Ps Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (Sweet & Maxwell , London 
1998) 166. 
61 see paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. 
62 Carlos M Correa, above, 43. 
63 Daniel Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analyses (Sweet & Maxwell , London 
1998) 166. 
64 See article 31 (b) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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oue__ex.ception and may be waived in cases of "a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use". 
Article 31 contains further conditions, such as a limitation with regard to the 
time for which the licence shall be granted,65 that the use shall be non-exclusive,66 
the use shall be non-assignable,67 and that "any such use shall be authorised 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorising such 
use" (as discussed below, a particularly contentious condition). It is further required 
that "the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of 
each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorisation".68 Member 
States are further obliged to ensure that the legal decision to grant a compulsory 
license is subject to judicial review or "other independent review by a distinct higher 
authority in that Member".69 
3 Compulsory licenses, developing countries and medicines 
Because of the special situation facing many developing countries, 
developing countries that did not provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals prior 
to the TRIPS Agreement are allowed until 1 January 2005 to implement such 
protection, and in the case of least developed countries, until 1 January 2006. 
This extended period for compliance with the TRIPS standards has been 
further extended by the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, which states under paragraph 7: 
We reaffirm the commitment of developed-country Members to provide 
incentives to their enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage 
technology transfer to least-developed country Members pursuant to 
Article 66.2. We also agree that the least-developed country Members 
will not be obliged, with respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement 
or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce 
rights provided for under these Sections until l January 2016, without 
65 See article 3 l(c) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
66 See article 31 ( d) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
67 See article 31 ( e) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
68 See article 31 (h) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
69 See article 31 U) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
22 
prejudice to the right of least-developed country Members to seek other 
extensions of the transition periods as provided for in Article 66.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to take the 
necessary action to give effect to this pursuant to Article 66. l of the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
Because of this exception, developing country Members are not obliged to 
provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products, which means that there is no 
need to make use of the opportunity of compulsory licenses for developing countries 
until they actually provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals. The granting of 
compulsory licenses is nevertheless important in those developing countries which 
have already provided patent protection regulation which is consistent with the 
TRIPS standards. 
The production of generics under compulsory licenses is limited by article 
31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 31(f) provides that "any such use shall be 
authorised predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member 
authorising such use". 
This provision creates a trap for those developing countries that need access to cheap 
medicine but cannot afford to produce medicine themselves . This is because article ...,, 
3-lfB-does i:1ot allow other countries, for example developing countries which can 
afford to produce generics, to export these drugs to the poorest countries which 
cannot afford to produce their own generics, since production under a compulsory 
~·· ) -+-;, 
licence may only be authofi.sed- to predominantly supply the domestic market. The 
wording of article 31(f) is unambiguous, so that it is difficult to find an interpretation 
of the TRIPS Agreement which would allow the export of generics to countries that 
cannot afford to produce their own medicine. 
It has been argued, however, that the TRIPS Agreement would allow a 
Member State to issue a compulsory licence to a manufacturer in another country, 
provided that the government of the other country recognised the licence, and 
provided that all the goods provided under the licence were exported to the country 
LAW LIBR RY 
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granting the original licence.70 Given the rigidity of article 31, it seems that such an 
exception could only be justified under article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
It has been pointed out earlier that the relationship between articles 30 and 31 
of the TRIPS Agreement must be seen as that of a general clause on the one hand and 
a special provision on the other hand. It must be considered a basic rule of statutory 
interpretation that a general clause cannot apply to cases which are explicitly dealt 
with. In this case, article 31 (f) says explicitly that the authorised use should be 
predominantly for the domestic market. This implies that it should not be possible for 
a government to authorise the production generics for export to a foreign market.'\ 
It may well be that the negotiators of the TRIPS Agreement were not aware of 
the consequences of the provision or that they did not intend to prevent least-
developed countries from importing generics. This, however, does not change the 
fact that article 31(f) provides an obstacle to the export of generics. 
In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to change the text of the 
Agreement, ·rather than trying to argue around the clear wording of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Indeed, it is impossible to predict whether WTO Dispute Settlement 
Organs would adopt a pennissive interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement71 that 
would be contrary to the explicit text of the Agreement. 
4 Compulsory Licensing and the Ministerial Declaration 
Compulsory licensing and the problems caused by the TRIPS Agreement 
were the subject of discussions during the Ministerial Conference, and the 
Ministerial Declaration deals explicitly with the subject of compulsory licensing. 
70 WTO "Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States" (12 June 2001) 
W/C/W/280, Paragraph 13. 
71 WTO "Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States" (12 June 2001) 
W/C/W/280, Paragraph 13. 
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(a) Paragraph 5(b) and (c) of the Ministerial Declaration 
Paragraph 5 (b) and (c) of the Ministerial Declaration deal with compulsory 
licensing. It has been indicated earlier that paragraph 5(b) does not contain anything 
new, but that it is of rather confirming character in that it acknowledges that Member 
States are free in determining the grounds on which Members may grant compulsory 
licenses. 
Paragraph 5 ( c) states: 
Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that the public 
health crises, including those relating to HIV/Aids, tuberculosis, malaria and 
other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency. 
It is unlikely that anyone would challenge a determination by a developing 
country heavily hit by HIV/AIDS that they are faced with a national emergency or a 
circumstance of extreme urgency within the meaning of article 3l(b). Indeed, the 
EU, in a paper prior to the Doha Conference, expressed the view that 
"as for the level of HIV/ AIDS infection reported in some developing countries, 
there would appear to be very good reasons for describing it as a 'national 
emergency' or as a 'circumstance of extreme urgency' ."72 
The inclusion of paragraph 5(c) in the Ministerial Declaration is a step 
forward insofar as it gives legal certainty to developing countries hit by HIV/AIDS 
or other infectious diseases. It confirms that a health crisis of this nature can indeed 
constitute a "national emergency" or other "circumstance of extreme urgency" in 
terms of article 31(b). 
This position is not without controversy. Alan O Sykes commented, in regards 
to paragraph 5 (c), that 
72 WTO "Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States" (12 June 2001) 
J.P/C/W/280. 
the apparent position of developing nations and their supporters is that they can 
now declare a "national emergency" at their sole discretion on grounds of a 
public health problem, and thereafter issue compulsory licenses for production 
to serve their domestic markets without prior negotiation and with minimal 
royalties payable to the patent holder.73 
The concern expressed by Alan O Sykes may be overstating the effect of 
paragraph 5(c). The paragraph does nothing more than clarify that Members accept 
that a national health crisis constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency within the meaning of article 31 (b ). In any event, Member States 
always had the right to determine for themselves what constitutes a national 
emergency of other circumstance of extreme urgency. It does in no way broaden the 
ambit of article 31 (b) in a way that would be detrimental to patent holders. Indeed, 
it does not in fact broaden the ambit of article 31 at all. 
(b) Paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration 
Paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration states: 
We recognise that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities 
in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council on 
TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General 
Council before the end of 2002. 
By identifying the lack of access for the poorest of the developing countries as 
one of the main problems of the TRIPS Agreement, the Ministerial Conference has 
unquestionably taken a step in the tight direction. However, one should not be too 
enthusiastic, as it is by no means foreseeable additional solutions the Council will 
propose. 
Alan O Sykes wrote "the Doha Declaration opens the door wider to 
compulsory licensing .. . of patented pharmaceuticals by developing countries" .74 
73 Alan O Sykes "TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha Solution" John M 
Olin Law & Economics Working Paper (No 140, 211d Series) 11. 
74 Alan O Sykes, above, 10. 
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Again, this may be overstating the effect of the Ministerial Declaration, given that 
the Ministerial Declaration does not go beyond what was already accepted. The 
Ministerial Declaration does not offer a concrete solution to the more fundamental 
problem of access to cheap pharmaceuticals for countries that cannot afford to 
produce their own generics. It is on this point that clarification is desperately 
needed. 
5 Suggestion of developing countries to solve the problem constituted by 
article 31 (j) 
Faced with the problems of article 31(f), a group of developing countries75 
suggested including the following provision in a Ministerial Declaration: 
A compulsory licence issued by a Member may be given effect by another 
Member. Such other Member may authorise a supplier within its territory to make 
and export the product covered by the licence predominantly for the supply of the 
domestic market of the Member granting the licence. Production and export under 
these conditions do not infringe the rights of the patent holder. 
This approach potentially offers a solution to the current problem, and is 
worthy of consideration. Implementing a provision which would allow other 
countries to give effect to compulsory licenses granted by other Member States 
would in effect largely repeal the current article 31 (f). 
This would allow Member States capable of producing generic medicine to 
export generic medicine without infringing patents granted to inventors. Under the 
current TRIPS regime, this option is only available when the producing country does 
not grant patent protection for the original product. 
The suggested approach would not only allow developing countries greater 
and cheaper access to medicine, but might also promote the introduction of patent 
protection by developing countries before the end of the transition period provided 
for in the TRIPS Agreement. This is because the oppo1tunity of exporting generics is 
currently limited by article 3 l(f). Developing countries capable of producing 
75 WTO "Draft Ministerial Declaration" (4 October 2001) W/C/W/ 312 or WT/GC/W450. 
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genencs that wish to help other developing countries that are not capable of 
producing their own medicine, are only able to do so if they do not provide any 
patent protection at all. If they would be given the opportunity, as suggested by the 
group of developing countries, then countries capable of the production of generics 
could grant patent protection for medicine and legally supply other developing 
countries with generic medicine. 
The Council on TRIPS was instructed to find an expeditious solution to the 
problem of exporting generics and should definitely take into account the solution 
offered by the developing countries, since the approach offers an opportunity which 
is fair to all parties involved. It is fair for the poorest developing countries because 
they would be granted an opportunity to legally access cheap medicine under the 
TRIPS Agreement, but it is also fair to the pharmaceutical industry, which loses no 
more in benefits than it would lose if the poorest developing countries were capable 
of producing their own generic versions of patented medicine, and granted a 
compulsory licence. 
A further effect of this proposal suggested in the draft Ministerial Declaration 
of the group of developing countries would be that developing countries which are 
not able to produce generics on their own could start producing medicine together in 
the form of joint ventures. The problem under the cuJTent Agreement is that the joint 
production of pharmaceuticals by a number of developing countries would not be 
legal , due to the fact that the country in which the medicine is actually produced 
could not licence the production of medicine on its soil for the exportation to other 
countries. This new opportunity provides an additional argument for allowing 
Member States to give effect to foreign compulsory licenses. 
Abbott recommended that developing countries that are subject to the 
transitional period and wish to have access to low-price medicines under patents 
granted elsewhere, should not provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals until 
they are required to comply with the TRIPS standards.76 
Now that the least developed countries have an extended period of time until they are 
required to comply with the standards set out in the TRIPS Agreement, these 
28 
countries should follow this advice and not introduce patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals before the end of that extended period, unless the Members decide 
to implement provisions that allow Members to export generics to countries which 
cannot themselves afford the production of medicine. 
The approach taken in the draft Ministerial Declaration by some developing 
countries is certainly an option that would help to improve the situation for least 
developed countries as well as encourage developing countries to introduce patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals. Therefore, the Council on TRIPS should adopt the 
approach taken by the developing countries and suggest a change of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
6 Compensation 
A question which is directly linked to the problem discussed above is the 
question of compensation payable to the patent holder upon the granting of a 
compulsory licence. It might be arguable that if a future form of the TRIPS 
Agreement allows the exportation of generics, the patent holder should receive a 
consideration from the producing country on the one hand and from the importing 
country on the other hand. However there is no good reason why both the exporting 
and importing country should pay a consideration to the patent holder, where this 
amounts to a duplication in payment of compensation. The patent holder should not 
receive a consideration exceeding that which they would have received if the 
importing country had produced its own generics. In that case each country would 
have paid a consideration dependent on the amount of produced medicine. Since the 
overall amount of produced generics does not increase if one country produces 
generics in order to supply a second country, there is no greater impact on the 
legitimate interests of the patent holder. Therefore there is no reason for paying a 
consideration higher than that which the patent holder would receive if both 
countries, ie the producing and the importing country, would produce their own 
genencs. 
76 Frederick Abbott "The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial 
Conference" (Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, 8 September 2001 ) 9. 
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7 Judicial Review of Decisions by National Authorities 
One important obligation Member States have with regard to the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights is that they must ensure availability of ''judicial or other 
independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member"77 of decisions 
regarding both the granting of a compulsory license and as well as the remuneration 
patent holders are entitled to as compensation. 
Some Member States may suffer from a lack of administrative and judicial 
capacity necessary to guarantee an adequate standard of review. 
It is unambiguous that the obligation in the TRIPS Agreement to make available 
review "distinct higher authority in that Member" requires that the decision must be 
made by a national authority. However, this provision does not preclude developing 
countries from working together when examining decisions made with regard to 
compulsory licenses. Since the TRIPS Agreement only requires that the review must 
be undertaken by a national authority, it is therefore legal for developing countries to 
appoint foreign experts, for example from other developing countries, to the 
reviewing ·authority. Such an approach might not only help developing countries to 
reach an improved standard of review, due to the fact that they can "join forces", but 
it may also help to establish a certain standard of uniformity with regard to the 
decisions made by developing countries. Greater uniformity in decisions means that 
it is more likely a Dispute Settlement Body will accept the common praxis among 
developing Members in their decisions. Therefore, developing countries should take 
into consideration the appointment of experts from other countries to their reviewing 
authorities. 
8 Conclusion 
Although the Ministerial Declaration has brought some clarity to the area of 
compulsory licensing, the main issue remains to be solved, that is, whether Member 
States should be able to give effect to compulsory licenses issued by other Members. 
As argued above there are good reasons for adopting the approach taken by the 
developing countries. 
77 See article 3l(i) and U) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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It is important to ensure, however, that developing countries which intend to make 
use of their right under the TRIPS Agreement to issue compulsory licenses are not 
deterred from doing so by threats from other Members. 
Until now no Member has ever made use of the opportunity to issue a compulsory 
license under article 31. When Thailand, having an adult IIlV / AIDS infection rate of 
5%, intended to make use of compulsory licensing in order to produce the drug 
Didanosine owned by Bristol-Myers Squibb, they reportedly faced considerable trade 
pressure from the US.78 Given that a decision in favour of compulsory licensing 
might have endangered trade relations between Thailand and its most important 
trading partner, the Thai Public Health Minister ultimately did not authorise the 
production of the drug.79 
In the future Member States must stop putting pressure on developing 
countries wishing to use the compulsory licensing scheme, other than by using the 
means that are provided in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement to challenge 
national authorities' decisions. 
B Parallel Importing 
1 Parallel importing in general 
The increasing globalisation of businesses, trade, brands and products, 
coupled with the unequal distribution of wealth across the world has made the 
practice of parallel importing an attractive business. The term parallel importing 
refers to the practice of importing goods protected by intellectual property rights 
without the authority of the owner of relevant intellectual property rights, to be sold 
alongside those placed directly on the market by the owner of the same rights. 80 The 
intellectual property right does not necessarily need to be a patent; it may be that the 
intellectual property right involved is a trademark or a copyright or even a 
combination of different intellectual property rights. 
78 Judy Rein "International Governance Through Trade Agreements: Patent Protection for Essential 
Medicines" (2001) 21 NW J Int'l L & Bus 379, 402/403. 
79 Judy Rein, above, 402/403. 
80 Stuart Jackson and Richard Kempner "Parallel Imports Into and Within the European Union" in 
Melvin Simensky, Lanning Bryer, and Neil J Wilkoff (ed) Intellectual Property in th e Global 
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It is important to note that the imported products are not illegal products, ie 
counterfeited products, but original products that have been placed by the rights 
holder on the market in another country. 
As mentioned above, parallel imports gain their attractiveness from the fact that not 
all countries in the world have the same standards of Ii ving, wealth, and income. 
Due to this fact, companies with international operations are making use of so called 
"discriminatory pricing" practices. 
Companies that operate across borders often charge different prices across different 
markets, if the elasticity of demand in different markets differs at a common price.
81 
The lower the elasticity in market is, the higher the product's price will generally 
be. 82 A further factor which has an influence on the prices companies will charge 
across different markets, is the average income, since consumers in higher income 
countries will usually be able to pay higher prices than consumers in countries with 
lower incomes.83 The practice of price discrimination can therefore lead to 
considerable differences with regard to the prices charged across different markets. 
Although one might think that the benefits for developing countries which they can 
obtain by applying parallel importing strategies should be limited, this conclusion 
can not be drawn with regard to pharmaceuticals. 
Generally speaking, prices for the same medicine m developed countries will be 
higher than the prices charged in developing countries, so that it would not make 
sense to import medicine from developed countries. The reason why parallel 
importing strategies can still make sense for developing countries is that the prices 
for patented pharmaceuticals differ among the markets of different developing 
countries. 84 
The theoretical approach behind parallel importing strategies is quite simple. It leads 
to competition on the market to which the products are imported and might 
encourage the patent holder to lower prices for products which are imported by either 
himself or the person which has obtained a license for importing the product to a 
specific market. 
Marketplace (2"d ed, John Wiley & Sons Inc, New York, Chichester, Weinheim, Brisbane, Toronto, 
Singapore, 1999) Chapter 14.1. 
81 Alan O Sykes "TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha Solution" John M 
Olin Law & Economics Working Paper (No 140, 2"d Series) 19. 
82 Alan O Sykes, above, 19. 
83 Alan O Sykes, above, 19. 
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2 Criticism and lessons from the EU 
Parallel importing occurs quite frequently throughout the world and has been 
permitted in many developed as well as developing countries. 
For instance, in the European Communities (EC) the European Court of Justice has 
applied the doctrine of regional exhaustion of rights to the entire EC and to different 
types of IPRs, in order to prevent market segmentation. Once a patented product has 
been sold in an EC country, it can be resold in any other member country without 
infringing on the IPR holder's rights. 85 Parallel importing has also held to be 
legitimate in Japan. 
Critics of parallel importing strategies argue, that the legality of parallel 
trading policies might be detrimental in the long run to countries which need cheap 
medicine the most, rather than being beneficial to these countries. 
86 
Critics argue that parallel pricing policies might prevent market segmentation and 
price discrimination by patent holders, thereby eliminating the key conditions for 
parallel pricing to be justifiable. While there seems to be a good logic behind this 
approach, the conclusion is nevertheless questionable. 
One of the most important underlying structures of the European Union is the 
Common Market, the pursuit of which is guaranteed by article 30 of the Treaty of 
Rome. 87 This article guarantees the free movement of goods within the Member 
States, regardless of whether or not a certain product has patent protection. 
In 1974 the ECJ had to deal with the Centrafarm v Sterling case,
88 in which 
the patent rights for a certain drug in several Member States were owned by Sterling 
Drug Inc, the parent company, and were licensed to several subsidiaries who then 
sold the drug in several Member States, including the UK, Germany, and the 
84 Margaret Duckett "Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Importing: What do they mean? Will they 
improve access to essential drugs for people living with HIV/AIDS?" Background Paper ICASO 
(1999) Paragraph 3 www.icaso.org/docs/compulsoryenglish.htm (last accessed 25 February 2002). 
85 Carlos M Correa "Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries" (2001) 3 Tu! J 
Tech & Intell Prop, 38/39. 
86 See for example Alan O Sykes "TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha 
Solution" John M Olin Law & Economics Working Paper (No 140, 2"d Series) 20; Carlos M Correa, 
above, 17. 
87 Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome), 25 March 1957. 
88 Centrafarm BV v Sterling Drug Inc [ 1974] 2 CMLR 480 (ECJ). 
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Netherlands. Centrafann imported patented drugs that were legally put on the UK 
and German market by Sterling and its subsidiaries to the Netherlands, without 
Sterling's consent. Sterling challenged this practice arguing that it would infringe 
their exclusive rights as the patent holder for the imported drug. 
The ECJ found that a patentee cannot use his exclusive rights in a Member 
State to block imports of a product that has been marketed by either himself or with 
his consent in another Member State, irrespective of the existence of price 
differences and reasons for the difference of prices. 
The ECJ supported its findings by stating that the exclusive rights to use an 
invention with a view to manufacturing industrial property and putting it into 
circulation for the first time was the reward given to the patentee in exchange for his 
creative efforts. Once this reward is reaped by the patentee, the free movement of 
goods prevails over the patentee's interest in further controlling the product in 
circulation. 
The Court noted two exceptions. Firstly, this principle does not apply where 
the patent holder in the importing country is economically and legally independent 
from the patent holder in the exporting country. Secondly, it does not apply in cases 
in which the product was not patentable and had been manufactured there by a third 
party without the patentee's consent. 
Later the ECJ had to decide a case in which goods were imported from a 
Member State where they had been sold with the patentee's consent but where patent 
protection was not available. 89 Merck was the patent holder for the drug "Moduretic" 
in the Netherlands, which was imported by the defendant into the Netherlands from 
Italy, where no patent protection for the specific drug was available. Merck itself 
t1ied to use its patent in the Netherlands against the impo1tation of the drugs from 
Italy by the defendant, as the defendant sold the imported drug at lower prices than 
Merck. Merck argued that the importation of drugs from a Member State in which no 
patent protection was available, constituted an infringement of Merck's patent in the 
Netherlands. Even in this case the ECJ decided that the patent holder (Merck) could 
89 Merck & Co. Inc. v. Stephar B. V and Petrus Stephanus Exler [1981] 3 CMLR 463 (ECJ). 
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not take action against the importation of the drug to the Netherlands, although the 
drugs imported in competition were imported from a jurisdiction under which the 
patent holder had not had the chance to collect a reward for its creativity due to the 
lack of patent protection. 
The ECJ took the position that it is the patent holder 's decision where and under 
which circumstances he decides to market his product. In case he decides to market 
the product in a Member State which does not grant patent protection, then the patent 
holder must bear the consequences of his choice as regards the free movement of the 
product in the Common Market.
90 
These decisions show that the principle of exhaustion is recognised within the 
European Union and that parallel imports are therefore perfectly legal. 
If the critics of parallel importing policies would be right, one should expect 
that pharmaceutical companies would charge uniform prices in all of the EU Member 
States. Indeed, this would seem to be a highly probable result since the export of 
drugs within the European Union is relatively easy and not very costly, due to a 
sophisticated transportation infrastructure throughout Europe. 
However, UNICEF, UNAIDS, the WHO and MSF have undertaken a survey 
in which they collected data on the supply of certain drugs used in the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS.91 The survey was published in October 2000 and provides, amongst 
other data, the price for each medicine that was charged in the UK on the one hand 
and in Spain on the other hand. 
One of the medicines compared was Amphotericin B, a drug which is of 
importance in connection with the treatment of infections that affect people living 
with HIV/AIDS. Amphotericin B is an relatively old, but difficult to manufacture 
drug and genetic versions of the drug do not exi st. The drug is marketed world-wide 
by Bristol-Myers-Squibb.
92 Although the same company markets the drug all over 
the world, there was a considerable price difference between the price charged in the 
90 Merck & Co. Inc. v. Stephar B. V. and Petrus Stephanus Exler [1981] 3 CMLR 463 , 481 (ECJ). 
91 Unicef, UN AIDS , WHO/EDM, MSF "Selected Drugs used in the Care of People Living with HIV: 
Sources and Prices" (October 2000) 
<http://www.unaids.org/acc_access/access_drugs/Drug_Database.htm> (last accessed 21 January 
2002). 
92 Unicef, UNAIDS, WHO/EDM, MSF, above, Paragraph 1.2. 
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UK and the price charged in Spain. The price charged in the UK was US$5.20 for a 
50mg unit, whereas the price for the same amount of the drug in Spain was only 
US$2.28.9
3 In other words, the price within one Member State of the EU was 56% 
below the price in the UK. 
The survey revealed similar results for the oral version of Itraconazole, a drug 
which is important in the treatment of fungal infections affecting HIV/ AIDS patients. 
Whereas the drug was sold for US$ 73.53 in the UK, the price charged for the same 
150ml unit was only US$ 48.07.
94 Again, a substantial price difference . 
Further examples in the list show that the price differences within the EU are 
often substantial, although parallel importing is, as we have seen, legal within the 
EU. Substantial price differences within the EU cannot only be seen in the area of 
pharmaceuticals, but occur also with regard to different products. 
Only recently, the EU Commission Directorate-General for Competition 
undertook a survey of the prices of cars within the EU, taking into account the prices 
before tax of a number of top selling cars in the Member States. The Commission 
found substantial price differences when comparing the prices of several models in 
Europe, with price differences ranging up to above 30 per cent.
95 
The examples given from the European market indicate that even in markets 
where parallel pricing is legal and where the exporting and importing of products is 
relatively easy to manage, the possibility of parallel importing does not necessarily 
lead to uniform pricing across markets. On the contrary, these companies are able to 
maintain their differential pricing policies. 
93 Unicef, UNAIDS, WHO/EDM, MSF, above, Paragraph 1.2 Table 2. 
94 Unicef, UNAIDS, WHO/EDM, MSF, above, Paragraph 1.2 Table 2. 
95 European Commission "Car Price Differentials in the European Union Remain High, Especially in 
the Mass Market Segment" (25 February 2002) Press Release ip/02/305 . 
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3 The legality of parallel importing 
The legality of parallel importing strategies depends largely on the question 
of whether or not the lack of authority for the importation of the protected goods 
necessarily renders these strategies illegal. 
The question depends on whether or not countries decide to follow the principle of 
exhaustion. Where countries decide to do so, parallel importing strategies do not 
constitute an infringement of the patent holder's rights. 
Under the principle of exhaustion of rights the exclusive rights guaranteed to 
patent holders by national legislation on intellectual property ends once the patent 
holder places the product on the market. 
The principle of exhaustion acknowledges the patent holder's right to exclusively 
determine the terms under which the patented product is put on the market, but that 
once the product has been distributed by the terms of his choice, the patent holder 
has been sufficiently rewarded for his efforts.
96 
Therefore, the patent holder shall not be given the right to further influence the use or 
resale of the product, and the patent holder's right is exhausted once it has been put 
on the market. 
4 Parallel importing, TRIPS, and developing countries 
A problem with regard to the current TRIPS Agreement is that the option of 
parallel importing is neither explicitly declared legal or illegal. Thus both positions 
have been argued to be right. 
The subject of international exhaustion was one of the most difficult subjects 
during the TRIPS negotiations. Article 6 leaves the question open , and states that the 
matter of international exhaustion cannot be brought before the WTO's dispute 
97 
settlement system. 
96 Carlos M Correa "Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries" (200 l ) 3 Tul J 
Tech & Intel Prop, 36. 
97 Daniel Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
1998) 61. 
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This solution is best described as an agreement to disagree, rather than a statement in 
favour of or against the practice of the exhaustion of rights principle. Because of this 
agreement to disagree, there has been a discussion about the legality of parallel 
importing strategies under the TRIPS Agreement. 
What can be said is that article 6 itself does not make a statement on the legality of 
parallel importing, but that the decision depends on other articles of the TRIPS 
Agreement. In case one takes the position that parallel importing is illegal under the 
Agreement, one would effectively come to the conclusion that although parallel 
importing is illegal, it could not be challenged before the dispute settlement bodies. 
Arguing in favour of the legality of parallel importing under the current 
TRIPS Agreement is problematic, due to the exclusive rights conferred to the patent 
holders under article 28(l)(a), which includes the guarantee of marketing and 
importing the product. Footnote 6 of the TRIPS Agreement makes it clear that all of 
the rights conferred on the patent holder are subject to article 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Although article 28.1 and 2 establish the rights that must be granted to 
the patent holder, it does not say anything about when these rights are exhausted. 
Looking at the rights which must be conferred to the patent holder by 
Member States in order to comply with TRIPS and the link between article 28 and 
article 6, established by footnote 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, the only conclusion can 
be that the TRIPS Agreement leaves the question of exhaustion to its Member States. 
Otherwise one would have a situation in which parallel importation would be illegal 
under the TRIPS Agreement, but in which the patent holders and Member States 
would not be able to enforce their rights in cases of parallel importing. This situation 
would be completely paradox. 
The Ministerial Declaration therefore did nothing more than clarify the rights 
of Member States when saying in paragraph 5(d): 
The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to 
establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the 
MFN and national treatment provisions of articles 3 and 4. 
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Although this passage has only clarifying character, it might well help to encourage 
developing countries in adopting parallel importing schemes the fear that this will 
cause costly litigation. 
Nonetheless, the same that has been said about compulsory licensing is equally true 
with regard to parallel importing. Member States, regardless of whether or not they 
like the idea of parallel importing, should not try and deter other Members from 
making use of what is their right under the TRIPS Agreement. 
VI CONCLUSION 
This paper has looked at the two most important ways in which developing 
countries can access cheap medicine. Throughout, there has been an emphasis on 
the question of whether or not the Doha Ministerial Declaration goes further than 
simply confirming already accepted legal opinions . 
Looking at the situation with regard to compulsory licensing and parallel 
impo11ing, it seems that the Doha Ministerial Declaration does not go beyond this 
confitming character. Given this, it would seem that the position of developing 
countries has not been substantially improved. 
It must, however, be considered a positive step forward that the community of 
WTO Member States has confirmed legal interpretations that are in favour of 
developing countries ' interests. 
One particularly positive aspect of the Doha Ministerial Declaration is that 
the Members expressly acknowledged that the TRIPS Agreement does not declare 
parallel imports as being illegal , so that developing countries do not need to fear 
costly litigation when making use of parallel imports by applying the exhaustion of 
rights p1inciple. 
With regard to compulsory licensing, there is a need to await the further 
suggestions of the Council on TRIPS. It has been shown that the approach taken by a 
number of developing countries, namely to give Members the right of giving effect 
39 
to compulsory licences issued by other Members, makes sense. Therefore, one can 
only hope, that this approach will be followed by the Council on TRIPS. 
Although the Ministerial Declaration points towards the right direction, one 
thing needs to be kept in mind. That is, that developing countries will only have a 
fair chance to access cheap medicine within the TRIPS framework if they do not 
need to fear that making use of the TRIPS exceptions will lead to political pressure 
by other countries' government or lobbyists. Other Member States have of course the 
right to challenge decisions by other governments within the WTO dispute settlement 
process as well as under national legislation. There can be no doubt that these are 
important rights. It must however be assured that a Member's legitimate right to 
allow exceptions for patent protection are challenged only by the use of the WTO 
settlement mechanism, rather than trying to thwart these "through the backdoor" by 
underhand means. 
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